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A posteriori probabilistic feasibility guarantees for Nash equilibria in uncertain multi-agent games
In this paper a distribution-free methodology is presented for providing robustness guarantees for Nash equilibria (NE) of multi-agent games. Leveraging recent a posteriori developments of the so called scenario approach (Campi et al., 2018), we provide probabilistic guarantees for feasibility probl
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