Kant and Freud on Moral Development: A Reappraisal

I present a critical review of one of the most influential trends in scholarship analysing the conceptual relationship between Freud and Kant in moral psychology. I discuss three Kantian sophisticated naturalistic approaches (KSNAs), which explore the possibility of accommodating Kantian moral imperatives within the Freudian psycho-developmentalist account, based primarily on the idea of the superego. Specifically, I examine three of their arguments about moral development that revolve around: (1) the relevance of guilt for moral orientation. The KNSAs propose that guilt is a moral feeling, the manifestation of a superego or moral conscience. I argue instead that guilt is not a moral feeling per se, although it can sometimes serve as a moral orientation. (2) The nature of our sources of moral motivation. For the KSNAs, it is irrelevant to think about the sources of our moral motivation because it is impossible to know them. I argue, however, for the relevance of the intelligibility of our moral commands, which should somehow match or resemble their moral source. (3) The concept of ideality. For the KNSAs, the superego’s commands are moral because they are ideal. I will argue that the ideality of the superego’s commands is, on the contrary, self-deceptive.