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Regulation by (Bad) Proxy: How Selective Application of Transaction Cost Economics Tainted the FTC's Proposed Ban of Employee Noncompete Agreements
Agencies have imperfect information about conduct they regulate. This problem is particularly acute when identical conduct has differing effects in various markets. Determining the economy-wide impact of such conduct can be difficult or impossible. The FTC faces such a challenge. The Commission has
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