Common Sense and Skepticism: Reid and Buffier

Common sense philosophy often resolves the threat of skepticism by appeal to epistemic realism. Reidian common sense, for instance, establishes that perception allows us to form a veridical conception of external objects from information delivered by the senses. Based on an eighteenth-century English translation of his work, some scholars have assumed that Buffier similarly relies upon common sense to defend epistemic realism. Through a comparative analysis of Reid and Buffier, this chapter shows that, for the latter, common sense does not resolve external world skepticism by appealing to the metaphysical underpinnings of external objects. Instead, anticipating elements of Hume’s philosophy, Buffier argues that universal agreement concerning the existence of external objects based on the deliverances of the senses cannot be used to justify claims about their metaphysical status. His understanding of common sense is therefore distinct from Reid’s because it responds to skepticism by appealing to the recognition of the limits of sensation. This analysis thereby reveals that Buffier’s position is clearly anti-realist.