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Coalition strategy-proof anonymous binary social choice in a countably infinite society
We study anonymous binary social choice functions on the universal weak-preference domain when the society of voters is countably infinite. Voters may strictly support one of the two alternatives or be indifferent, and non-manipulability is required in the form of coalitional strategy-proofness. Ful
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