Reasons of state as reasons in law: Understanding deep legal change with Hegel's theory of adjudication

Deep legal change occurs when, without legal justification, one legal rule is replaced by another. While often ignored in legal theory, these rule-breaking normative transformations are common and significant enough to warrant careful attention. In this thesis, I analyse the structure of deep legal change and discuss how a philosophically rigorous jurisprudence should approach a legal phenomenon that appears to be legally inexplicable. In particular, I focus on the implications of rule-breaking rule-changes for our conception of courts and legal reasoning. To understand why deep legal change occurs, we need to provide a normative explanation that clarifies why courts, as courts, have reasons to break the law. My solution takes me to G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Hegel invites us to think of the judicial process as being grounded in two institutional values: the establishment of legal security and the protection of the “universal interest” of the state. Sometimes, these two values come into conflict. In these moments, established legal rules give way to fundamental state-interests. With Hegel, we can say that it is inevitable that political reasons periodically override legal reasons. In deep legal change, the fundamentally political character of law becomes visible. While reminiscent of Carl Schmitt and the literature on emergency powers, this theory of law is much closer to the reason-of-state tradition. Against the background of several historical case studies and contemporary scholarship, I demonstrate the novelty, coherence, and explanatory power of a Hegelian account of deep legal change.