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Policy Targeting with Market Equilibrium
This paper develops a framework for individualized treatment allocation when interventions shift equilibrium prices and generate spillovers across treated and untreated units. The planner chooses which units receive a subsidy while allowing equilibrium prices to adjust endogenously. We show that the
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