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Analog Pin Directionality as an Exfiltration Attack Surface in Mixed-Signal ICs
Mixed-signal SoCs rely on nominally input-only analog pins to acquire off-chip signals, but the directionality of these interfaces is generally treated as a functional property rather than explicitly verified as a security property. This work identifies and experimentally demonstrates a directionali
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