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Bundling against Learning
A monopolist sells multiple goods to an uninformed buyer. The buyer chooses to learn any one-dimensional linear signal of his values for the goods, anticipating the seller's mechanism. The seller designs an optimal mechanism, anticipating the buyer's learning choice. In a generalized Gaussian enviro
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