Mutual Constraints: Philosophical Aesthetics and Empirical Evidence

This methodological essay develops a methodology for productive dialogue between philosophical aesthetics and empirical research on art. For empiricists, it identifies three standing constraints on how philosophical conclusions can be drawn from data: the normative/descriptive distinction (normative positions cannot be empirically falsified), the is–ought gap (descriptive findings do not on their own license normative conclusions), and the hard problem of consciousness (neural correlates do not resolve phenomenal questions). It derives from these constraints a concrete recommendation: researchers should pre-specify which class of philosophical position is targeted, what prediction distinguishes it from alternatives, and how strong the evidential pressure is. For theorists, it argues that descriptive positions face scalar empirical pressure calibrated by evidence quality, and that normative positions face prescriptive cost rather than falsification. Evidence from five empirical domains—neuroaesthetics, psychology of arts, computational aesthetics, cross-cultural aesthetics, and AI and creativity research —is assessed using this methodology against five classical philosophical debates: ontology, experience, interpretation, value, and creativity. The cross-domain verdict is consistent: extreme positions face strong pressure while intermediate frameworks integrating formal and contextual factors receive support across independent evidence streams.