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Patents and Incentives to Assign, License, or Litigate
This paper presents a model of the activity of patent intermediaries and potential infringers in a system of costly patent litigation. Because the intermediary, in comparison to the inventor, has a more credible threat to sue, both the revenue from infringement litigation and the intrinsic value of
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