Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
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On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem
There has been a spate of interest in the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to issues in the law. This theorem holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome. Its uses
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