Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
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The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. A
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