Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
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Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws
This piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds
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