Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
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Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation
This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders currently monitor performance
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