Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
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Empowering Shareholders, or Overburdening Companies? Analyzing the Potential Use of Instant Runoff Voting in Corporate Elections
Although hotly debated today, one of the prevailing theories in the mind of the public as to why the shareholders of a corporation possess the right to vote in corporate elections is the fact that shareholders "own" the corporation. Even though one academic has written that this theory is the "worst
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