Leaving Room for Life: Kant and the Life of the Mind

A prominent post-Kantian critique of Kant contends that Kant’s Critical philosophy is defensible only if his account of mental activity is grounded in life, subsequently denying that Kant grounds mental activities in life. I call this critique the inorganicism challenge. In what follows, I show that this challenge is neither extraneous nor vague, but must be taken seriously. I also show that Kant has the resources to rebut this challenge. In the first section, I contextualize the inorganicism challenge by demonstrating that it stems from a long line of (what I call) anti-realist readings of Kant’s doctrine of purposiveness. In the second section, I illustrate how anti-realist views have animated inorganicist challengers. In the third section, I explain that Kant actually does reserve a deep role for life in his theory of mind.