T1. Must Presentism Be Static? A Structural Understanding of Temporal Ontology

Presentism is often dismissed for its alleged ontological impoverishment and incompatibility with modern physics. In this article, we defend a structurally reformulated version of presentism, grounded not in the metaphysics of temporal slices but in the functional architecture of nomological constraints. We distinguish between ontological and nomological past, arguing that past-directed truths need not be anchored in presently subsisting entities, but can be structurally projected from the current state under lawful dynamics. This view preserves the truth-aptness of past-tense propositions, avoids ontological inflation, and remains compatible with relativis- tic and quantum frameworks. We propose that the present is best understood not as a static temporal point, but as a locally saturated structure a field of actualizing constraints capable of rounding temporal becoming and epistemic access. This structural presentism offers a realist yet dynamically grounded ontology, reconciling temporal truth with the demands of contemporary science.