Varieties of negligence

Negligence is often conceptualized as a failure of thought, yet social evaluations of negligence depend on how those failures occur. We present a unified framework predicting variation along three axes: whether the agent lacked diligence, whether the negligence reflected a process-level lapse in perception or memory, and whether the agent was factually or normatively ignorant with respect to their wrongdoing. Across four pre-registered experiments (N = 2,727), negligence type affected moral judgment. Process and diligence information differentially influenced blame, wrongness, and accidentality judgments. Using a judgment-updating paradigm, negligence information globally reduced perceived intentionality while selectively increasing blame for certain forms of negligence. Finally, we identified relevant priming effects: emphasizing ease of avoidance increased sanctions, whereas self-projection cues attenuated sanctions. Our results integrate across different lines of research on negligence and specify what factors are associated with different evaluations. We also identify policy-relevant considerations for jury instructions and sentencing for negligence.