Contradição ou contrariedade? : Cirne-Lima e a necessidade de correção do suposto sistema circular de Hegel

This is a challenge to one of the cen-tral interpretational theses that Cirne-Lima de-fends on Hegel: that we should read “contradic-tion” as “contrariety”. At first, I reconstruct Cirne-Lima’s interpretation and raise two cri-tiques: (I) Cirne-Lima ignores the origin of the concept “contradiction” as applied to statements of conceptual identity; (ii) Cirne-Lima only pays attention to one type of incompatibility involved in the “negation” that constitutes contradiction and forgets Hegel’s thesis on the “bound return to the ground”. In the final parts of my paper, I dis-cuss the consequences of Cirne-Lima’s interpre-tation. The consequence of (i) is the development of an interpretation that doesn’t regard anything beyond what Hegel calls “external reflection” (“isof predication”) and ignores the role of “contra-diction” in “inner reflection” (“is of identity”). That of (ii) is the interpretation of “contradiction” as a mere “play of opposites”. I suggest that this last constraint is analogous to what Brandom calls “material incompatibility” and completely misses one of the main dimensions of Hegel’s “negative”: self-reference. To support my argu-ment (i) I rely on Pippin's remarks on the Logic of Essence and, in the case of (ii), Henrich’s the-sis, which Bordignon followed to criticize Bran-dom, that to be self-referential is a constitutive di-mension of “determinate negation”