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Spoofing Missed-Detection Bounds for PRF GNSS Ranging Authentication Under AWGN Models
Pseudorandom-function (PRF) ranging codes, such as those used in Galileo's encrypted E6-C under the Signal Authentication Service (SAS), enable a receiver to authenticate pseudoranges once the PRF secret is revealed. This work bounds how much authentication security the receiver obtains under Additi
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