Reexamining Reward and Punishment: Questioning Who We Are and What We Deserve

In this piece, I ultimately argue against the validity of punishment and reward. This is accomplished through accepting three general statements about punishment and deserving, endurance and responsibility, and identity and time. These premises are: (1) Punishment is justified if and only if the thing being punished is deserving of punishment (2) If a thing is deserving of punishment, then the thing being punished must have the exact same properties as the thing that committed the punishment worthy action. (3) It is impossible for any thing being punished to have the exact same properties as the thing that committed the punishment worthy action. I then assert that if this argument is valid and sound, punishment is not justified through a modus tollens relationship. Further, I argue that any metaethical relationship that holds for punishment must also hold for reward just in the inverse. Thus, reward is not justified either. I conclude by discussing what I call the aftermath of accepting this conclusion. If we are to disregard the conceptualizations of punishment and reward, many aspects of our world would be deeply affected as many of our systems of justice and economy would be invalidated. The consequences are too far reaching to full address here, but I focus on how I think this understanding ought to shape our conceptions of debts and responsibilities, criminal justice, and resource distribution.