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Competitive Advantage in Alliance Governance: Resolving the Opportunism MinimizationâGain Maximization Paradox
This paper offers a model of alliance governance that explicitly recognizes that managers of alliances simultaneously face the objectives of maximizing gains from trade while minimizing the threat of opportunism in the transactionâan apparent paradox. Our model shows that both the gains from trade
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