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Assessing Runtime Electromagnetic Detection of CPU Hardware Trojans Targeting Kernel Memory
Side-channels are a promising approach for hardware trojan detection, as they can passively reveal malicious hardware activity without requiring additional circuitry or destructive analysis of the device under test. This work investigates the use of electromagnetic (EM) emanations for runtime detect
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