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Testing for Monotone Equilibrium Strategies in Games of Incomplete Information
This paper develops a unified framework for testing monotonicity of Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies in unobserved types in games of incomplete information. We show that, under symmetric independent private types, monotonicity of differentiable equilibrium strategies is equivalent to monotonicit
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