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Is Truth Enough? Epistemic Reasons and the Value-Free Ideal
The Value-Free Ideal (VFI) holds that non-epistemic values, such as moral, political, and social values, should not influence scientific reasoning. A common motivation for the VFI appeals to the idea that scientific inquiry is governed by epistemic rationality, which in turn disregards non-evidentia
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