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Wherefore BIC = DIC?
I show that the equivalence in finite social-choice environments of Bayesian incentive compatibility and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility holds universally if and only if every type-dependent difference in the valuation of prizes operates through a single scalar type index. Beyond binary do
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