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Rouxii: Exploiting Honeypots with Deception-Aware AI Pentesters
Honeypots are designed to deceive attackers, and recent work shows they can also derail autonomous LLM-based pentesters. These evaluations, however, largely consider attackers unaware of the deception they face. We study the opposite setting: an autonomous attacker explicitly equipped to recognize a
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