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Calibrated Bait: Defensive Information Design under Adversarial Fingerprinting
A honeytoken, a decoy credential or record whose use reveals an intruder, produces defence intelligence only if an adversary sometimes treats it as genuine. The adversary can instead pay to fingerprint it. I model this problem as information design followed by receiver information acquisition. Witho
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