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Continuous auction models
We study a discrete-time auction model in which multiple sellers update their bids according to their performance in the preceding round. Bidders aim to maximize their profits and adjust their bids solely based on their most recent outcome (myopic behavior). In each round, the auctioneer purchases t
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