Enlighten Publications
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Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non-)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality
Why do governments fail to implement policy commitments in contractual agreements with international organizations? While scholars have scrutinized domestic factors as obstacles to compliance, we argue that reform programs may be unimplementable by design. We study this hypothesis in the context of
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