arXiv (OAI Expanded)
open access
Reserve Systems with Match-Specific Beneficiaries
We study two-sided matching problems in which the designer regards certain participant--institution matches as socially desirable ('beneficiary matches') and seeks to promote such matches. This objective can conflict with maximizing the total number of matches. We introduce minimal cycles to charact
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Cayley Tournaments Simultaneously Critical for the Clique and Dichromatic Numbers#985991
- MatchWork#273000
- Structural Reductions for Monochromatic Matchings and Ramsey Tilings#652365
- Structural Reductions for Monochromatic Matchings and Ramsey Tilings#650912
- Learning for Graph Matching and Related Combinatorial Optimization Problems#478214
Record · ID 1069696
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive