Pragmatism about Philosophical Belief

This chapter defends pragmatism about philosophical belief, the thesis that we sometimes ought to believe philosophical views for pragmatic reasons. I argue that in cases of significant belief, where abandoning the belief would unsettle central aspects of one’s identity, relationships, or ground projects, we ought to believe against the total evidence. I call this the 'Breach of Integrity' condition. It allows believing against the total evidence when revision would result in a substantial breach of the believer's integrity, when the belief is not itself morally wrong, and when, even though the belief might be unjustified, it's not the case that the person lacks evidence entirely for their belief. Philosophical belief in these cases isn’t just a stance in an academic debate, but reflective of one’s core personal commitments. I position this kind of pragmatism alongside related views about the attitude we should take to our philosophical views, like championing and endorsement, highlight the advantages of pragmatism about philosophical belief, and then argue that pragmatism complements equilibrism, the view that philosophy seeks an equilibrium between our philosophical views and certain of our other beliefs.