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On the Effectiveness of Kernel-Level Evidence for Agent Security
LLM agents are deployed into infrastructure that grants them broad host authority, yet existing agent-security benchmarks and defenses operate almost exclusively at the application telemetry layer: the served tool manifest, the user prompt, and the model's messages. Some threats, however, smuggle ma
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