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On finite-horizon approximation of an infinite-horizon feedback Nash equilibrium in discrete-time LQ games
Computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games remains computationally challenging. Inspired by model predictive control (MPC) in single-agent optimal control, we address this challenge with a finite-horizon strategy for approximating
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