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Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation: why the European Parliament won at Amsterdam
It is a widely accepted that the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments did this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP
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