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Rawls’s Theory of Justice and Affirmative Action in Science
Rival applied ethicists have constructed arguments for and against affirmative action independently of Rawls’s theory of justice. Those arguments do not resolve the dispute about affirmative action. I reformulate them with the use of Rawls’s theory of justice and conclude that the reformulated arguments do not resolve the dispute about affirmative action either. Therefore, Rawls’s theory of justice is not useful in resolving the dispute about affirmative action. This point applies to affirmative action in science, contrary to what some writers suggest.
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