arXiv (OAI Expanded)
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Protected domains and the cost of cooperation on weighted networks
Contacts that protect a cooperative group can also make its founding sites difficult for newborn mutants to reach. We study this tension in a donation game with benefit $b$ and cost $c$ on finite weighted networks. Reciprocal contacts determine averaged payoffs and route copying from sources selecte
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