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An Explicit Solution for the Two-Bidder All-Pay Auction with Arbitrary Type Distributions
This paper provides an explicit characterization of the (unique) equilibrium of the two-bidder all-pay auction with asymmetrically distributed, independent private values. The characterization is achieved through recasting the problem into its equivalence in the quantile space and thereby obtaining
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