Progress, Objectivism, and Philosophy of History: the Problem of Progress in Critical Theory

In this paper, I evaluate Rahel Jaeggi's theory of progress as outlined in her recent book Fortschritt und Regression. The central question of this paper will be whether Jaeggi's theory of progress in terms of an “accumulating problemsolving process” can answer the critique of progress put forward by Amy Allen in The End of Progress. I argue that Jaeggi's approach can sidestep the problems put forward by Allen. Jaeggi's formal theory of progress allows her to disconnect the concept of progress as a fact from the idea of progress in the future because she does not have to make claims about the normative superiority of one form of life over another. In this paper, I will put forward a different challenge to Jaeggi's theory. Jaeggi must explain how we are to determine what counts as a successful procedure for solving second-order problems. I argue that in doing so she runs into a dilemma: she must either commit to a form of objectivism or accept a progressive reading of history.