ECB Working Papers
open access
Out with the new, in with the old? Supranational bank supervision and the composition of firm investment
Using exogenous variation generated by the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the euro area, we find that relative to firms borrowing from banks subject to national supervision, firms borrowing from banks subject to supranational supervision reduce their share of intangible assets
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