The Illusion of Human Agency: A Deterministic Critique of Free Will

The concept of human agency, which means the ability to control one’s actions independently, directly opposes the scientific idea of Causal Determinism. This paper critiques the existence of free will by bringing together the Libertarian idea of "alternative possibilities" and the Compatibilist idea of "acting on desire" into a single standard of Conscious Origination. By merging neurological data with logical reasoning, I argue that the conscious self does not act as a starter but rather as a reactive observer. First, an analysis of Benjamin Libet’s experiments shows that the brain’s Readiness Potential (RP) occurs about 350 milliseconds before conscious awareness (W), which reduces the feeling of having control to a post hoc justification. Second, the paper discusses the counter-argument of "Free Won't" (Veto power), claiming that this mechanism represents "Negative Agency." I show that the veto function is structurally reactive, acting more like a filter than a creator. Finally, I investigate where the motivations that adjust this filter come from. Through the idea of "Epistemic Opacity," I demonstrate that what we call internal desires are simply internalized external influences, such as biological and evolutionary urges. Therefore, by breaking down the Initiator, the Veto, and the Desire, this paper concludes that human agency is an illusion. Keywords: Free Will, Causal Determinism, Benjamin Libet, Negative Agency, Epistemic Opacity, Compatibilism, Readiness Potential.