How Could Philosophy Be Possible? An Analysis From the Model of the System of Schemes of Actions and Operations on Symbols and Signs

In addition to the studies of the constitutions of scientific notions carried out by Jean Piaget and collaborators, recent publications related to Genetic Epistemology have shown that the notion of construction of reality can be extended to encompass philosophical aspects (in a broad sense) of the construction of reality. In this context, it becomes necessary to understand *that*, *why*, and *how* various philosophical and scientific views of reality could be possible, and even necessary. Particularly, one might ask: Why do philosophical theories seem so real to the philosophers who propose them? Why is there a great diversity of philosophical theories, if they appear real to their authors? What would be, at least in general terms, the structures necessary for philosophical knowledge? As Genetic Epistemology constitutes a theory of knowledge that studies the structures necessary for knowledge, it should aim to answer these questions. The objective of this paper is to introduce into the English scientific-philosophical literature about Genetic Epistemology (an improved version of) the discussion made by Tassinari (in Portuguese, 2020) about how the Model of the System of Operations Schemes on Symbols and Signs (MoSSAOSS) Could contribute to explain the possibility of philosophical knowledge, and thus contribute to answer those questions. MoSSAOSS is a model introduced by Tassinari (in Portuguese, 2014, and in English, 2024), based on some of the main theoretical and experimental results achieved by Jean Piaget and his collaborators, articulating them in a systemic, systematic and synthetic view. Through the reasons expressed in MoSSAOSS, it is shown that there is always the possibility of a great diversity of philosophical theories, and each of them appears to be real to the philosopher who proposed it. The main reason would be that the coordination of their schemes of actions and operations on symbols and signs constitutes the real for them; or even, the various philosophical theories determine operations on signs (involving theoretical meanings) that coordinate the schemes of operations on symbols (especially, on mental images), regulating the possibilities of imagination and, consequently, the possibilities of behaviors attributed to objects and to their own actions. The conclusion is, therefore, that the system of schemes of actions and operations on symbols and signs would constitute a structure necessary for knowledge and its practice, not only for scientific knowledge, but also for philosophical knowledge. Finally, the results obtained would enable epistemic decentering as the philosophical vision that understands and explains the existence of different possible philosophical and scientific theories and views, as well as the different realities constructed due to them. In this sense, epistemic decentering would be a superior stage of the forms of understanding of reality, and would be the summit of the various forms of decentering established by Piaget and collaborators.