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First Galileo SAS Authenticated Time Solution
Spoofing attacks against civilian GNSS receivers have grown more common, especially near conflict zones where they now disrupt civil aviation, maritime operations, and critical infrastructure on a daily basis. Spoofing is possible because legacy civil GNSS signals are largely predictable in both the
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