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Implementability in Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection
We consider an insurance market with hidden information, where the agent's type is private information and is drawn from an arbitrary type space. We discuss the notion of implementability of the collection of retention functions. Namely, how to select premium schedules so that the resulting menu of
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