Neo-Conventionalism and the Imaginative Origin of Haecceitistic Intuitions

Modal neo-conventionalism accounts for metaphysical modality in terms of conceptual rules. Many modern neo-conventionalists have tried, in their own anti-metaphysical ways, to account for, rather than deny, important “metaphysical phenomena,” such as a posteriori necessity (Sidelle 1987, Thomasson 2020, Warren 2022a), de re modality (Povich 2024a,b, 2025, Sidelle 1987, Thomasson 2020), essence (Locke 2020, Locke and Thomasson 2023), grounding (Locke 2020), and counterpossibles (Locke 2019). In this paper, I aim to do the same for haecceitistic possibilities.