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BMA: Backchain Memory Attacks Create Unauthorized Control Paths in LLM Agents
Persistent memory enables LLM agents to reuse prior experience, but creates a new security boundary: what an agent may remember is not what it should act on. We expose an unauthorized control path where edited low-trust evidence is consolidated into persistent memory, retrieved on a clean task, and
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