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Disagreeing About What the Buyer Might Learn
I introduce a robustness criterion for settings where players may disagree about the distribution over signals induced by endogenously chosen information. In the spirit of Hansen and Sargent (2008), an information choice is evaluated by its worst-case payoff over beliefs within an $η$-entropy ball a
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