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MemPoison: Bypassing Selective Memory Mechanisms to Plant Backdoors in LLM Agents
Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly leverage long-term memory to support persistent and autonomous task execution. However, this capability also introduces a new attack surface: memory poisoning, where adversaries can inject malicious information to influence future behavior. Existing mem
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