Representation and Vorstellung in Kant

When discussing ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen) in Kant’s theoretical philosophy, many authors default to one of two basic approaches: (1) anything Kant calls a Vorstellung has some sort of semantic representational content (the Content Reading), or (2) Vorstellungen which do not have representational content are an exception to the rule, and present a puzzle to be solved (the Incongruity Reading). I argue that both these positions are mistaken. I first clarify the connotations of Vorstellung in the post-Leibnizian context from which Kant inherited the term. I argue that Leibniz’s notion of representational ‘expression’ and historical debates about the mind-body relationship illuminate Kant’s use of this term of art, while showing that the Content Reading and the Incongruity Reading falter in attributing to Kant a contemporary sense of ‘representation’ linked to semantic content. As an alternative, I develop the view that Kant’s Vorstellungen are mental forms of unity proper to the mind’s different faculties, which unify multiplicities in their respective ways. ‘Representations’ are ways of unifying multiplicities first and foremost, and it is a further question how features of these forms of unification could support an account of semantic representation.